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On Treating Something as a Reason for Action∗ 
Clayton Littlejohn 
 
HEN IS IT EPISTEMICALLY permissible to treat something as 
a reason for action in practical deliberation?1 According to 
Hawthorne and Stanley (2008):  
 
(KRP)  When S’s choice is p-dependent, it is 
permissible for S to treat the proposition that 
p as a reason for acting if and only if S knows 
that p.2 
 
In the wake of Hawthorne and Stanley’s article, epistemologists are lining up 
to argue that we ought to replace a knowledge-based account with some sort 
of justification-based account. According to Neta (forthcoming), we ought to 
reject KRP in favor of the weaker principle JBKRP:  
 
(JBKRP) When S’s choice is p-dependent, it is 
permissible for S to treat the proposition that 
p as a reason for acting if and only if S 
justifiably believes that she knows that p.3 
 
It is tempting to dismiss KRP on the grounds that it demands too much 
and delivers the wrong verdicts in some Gettier cases.4 Here is Neta’s version                                                         
∗ I would like to thank Mike Almeida, Dustin Locke, Errol Lord, Matt McGrath, Ram Neta 
and John Turri for incredibly helpful discussion and comments.  
1 Let’s assume that the kind of permissibility at issue here is epistemic permissibility. If it is not 
epistemically permissible to treat p as a reason for action, there is an undefeated epistemic 
reason to refrain from treating p as a reason for action. If there is no such reason, treating p 
as a reason for action is permissible. I’d prefer to work from an intuitive idea of when it is 
permissible to treat p as a reason for action to working from some theory about what sorts 
of epistemic reasons bear on whether to treat p as a reason for action. The success of the 
arguments sketched here should not depend on any particularly controversial assumptions 
about epistemic permissibility but rather rest on observations that I suspect any acceptable 
account of epistemic permissibility will accommodate. In saying that the issue has primarily 
to do with epistemic permissibility, I am in no way suggesting that the epistemic 
permissibility of treating p as a reason for action has nothing at all to do with, say, the moral 
permissibility of acting in accordance with the judgment that p is true. 
2 A choice between options x1 … xn is “p-dependent” if and only if the option most 
preferable of x1 … xn conditional on the proposition p is not the same as the option most 
preferable of x1 … xn conditional on the proposition that not-p.  
3 Fantl and McGrath (forthcoming) defend the view that if your belief that p is justified, then 
p is “eligible” to justify you in Φ-ing and so can permissibly be treated as a reason for action. 
They use Gettier cases and cases of non-culpably mistaken beliefs to attack KRP. Gibbons 
(forthcoming) defends a similar view about the epistemic constraints on the permissible use 
of reasons for action. Their views are thus subject to the same counterexample that Neta’s 
view is insofar as they classify the use of some non-culpably mistaken beliefs in practical 
deliberation as permissibly included in deliberation rather than excusably included. 
4 Brown (2008), Neta (forthcoming) and Williamson (2005) attack the claim that knowledge 
of p’s truth is sufficient for permissibly treating p as a reason for action. Neta does not think 
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of the objection: Suppose that you justifiably believe that your partner loves 
you, and suppose further that you justifiably believe that you know that this 
is the case. Suppose further that aliens have replaced most of the humans in 
your area with indistinguishable, emotionless doppelgangers. Let us suppose 
that you know that if you are unloved, you are better off buying beer. You 
know also that if you are loved, you are better off buying your partner 
flowers. Thus, the choice whether to use the money in your pocket to buy 
beer or buy flowers depends on whether your partner loves you. It seems 
that it is not wrong for you to choose the flowers over the beer acting on the 
belief that your partner loves you even if you don’t know that your partner 
loves you if the only reason you don’t know is that you live in love façade 
country.5 
It might seem that some sort of justification-based account must be true. 
It seems that justification is a deontological notion in the sense that you 
should never believe without justification and it is always permissible to 
believe p is the case if your belief that p is the case is justified. If you accept 
this while rejecting a justification account along the lines of JBKRP, you are 
committed to saying that situations can arise in which it is permissible to 
believe that p is the case but impermissible to include the belief that p is the 
case in deliberation even if you know that deliberation is concerned with 
some p-dependent choice. It is difficult to make sense of such a situation. 
Here, I shall argue that justification-based accounts are susceptible to a 
simple and damning objection that can be avoided only if pretty much 
everyone is wrong about what is involved in a belief’s justification.6 If we say 
that it is possible for there to be false, justified beliefs, there is a wide range 
of cases that constitute counterexamples to JBKRP that do not threaten 
KRP. If, however, we say that there cannot be false, justified beliefs, the 
alleged counterexamples to KRP would be counterexamples to JBKRP. In 
short, unless pretty much everyone is badly mistaken about what is involved 
in a belief’s justification, we cannot say that there is some general epistemic                                                         
that Brown’s proposed counterexample is genuine, but offers one of his own. Neither 
Brown nor Williamson believes that there is some single epistemic condition that a belief 
might meet that ensures that the belief can permissibly figure in practical deliberation. In this 
paper, I don’t take a stand on whether there is some single epistemic condition sufficient for 
permissibly relying on the belief that p in practical deliberation.  
5 If Hawthorne and Stanley say that it’s an excusable wrong, that still seems wrong as it 
seems there is nothing to excuse. It is worth noting that Gendler and Hawthorne (2005) 
argue that façade cases are not clear cases of justified, true belief without knowledge. It isn’t 
clear what Hawthorne or Stanley make of this sort of objection because it isn’t clear whether 
they will say you don’t know that you are loved. 
6 Is the truth of a belief necessary for that belief’s proper inclusion in deliberation? It is if 
KRP is true. Hawthorne and Stanley (2008) do not argue directly for the truth condition, but 
the objection I raise against JBKRP is the beginnings of such an argument. If epistemic 
permissibility is closed under obvious known entailment, just as it is impermissible to treat 
the belief that you should Φ as a reason for action when you should not Φ, it is 
impermissible to treat non-normative beliefs known to entail that you should Φ as reasons 
for action when you should not Φ.  
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condition that a belief could meet that would ensure that it could permissibly 
figure in practical deliberation and say that this condition is justification.  
Suppose you face a choice between two options, staying and going. If 
you go there will be trouble, but if you stay it will be double. So, suppose that 
you are obligated to go rather than stay. Let “p” be the proposition that you 
ought to stay rather than go. Because p is false, you cannot know that p is the 
case. Because you do not know that p is the case, according to KRP you 
should not treat p as a reason for action. Suppose it is possible to justifiably 
believe that you know p even if you do not know that p. (Imagine what you 
must in order to imagine that p is false but nevertheless justifiably believed.) 
Then, according to JBKRP, it is permissible to treat p as a reason for action 
in, say, pursuing means sufficient for bringing it about that you stay (e.g., 
sticking your foot in front of the closing door). But that’s absurd. How could 
it be permissible to treat the proposition that you should stay as a reason for 
acting when it is impermissible to stay?  
If you think that the falsity of a belief does not prevent that belief from 
being justified when that belief concerns contingent matters in the external 
world, it would be ad hoc to say that the falsity of a belief does prevent that 
belief from being justified when that belief is about what should be done 
rather than simply about what is the case.7 This objection can be avoided if 
you deny that it is possible for there to be false, justified beliefs.8 So, if we 
were to say that the right to treat some proposition or fact as a reason for 
action is secured once you justifiably believe that the proposition or fact is 
the case and combine this with the knowledge account of justified belief, the 
resultant account is immune to the objection just raised. However, if any 
Gettier case constitutes a counterexample to KRP, the same case constitutes 
a counterexample to JBKRP if we say that justification is factive.  
If you think that it is inconceivable that some sort of justified belief 
account along the lines of JBKRP could turn out to be false, it seems that 
you just might have to say that justification is factive. If justification is not 
factive, but justifiably believing that p is known suffices for permissibly                                                         
7 If you were to deny this, it seems that certain sorts of intuitively plausible closure principles 
would admit of far more counterexamples than intuitively plausible principles admit of. A 
subject might know various moral principles that have non-normative conditions of 
application while justifiably believing all manner of falsehoods about the non-normative 
application conditions that go into these principles and be unable to justifiably infer various 
things about the moral status of various courses of action being considered even if the 
subject came to these judgments by means of competent deduction from false non-
normative assumptions and moral principles known to be true. Of course, one could try to 
deal with this objection by asserting that there cannot be genuine moral principles whose 
conditions of application we have justified but mistaken beliefs about and also insist that we 
cannot have justified but mistaken beliefs about which moral principles are genuine. I think 
this would be a desperate maneuver to save a theory, and I doubt it could succeed for 
reasons discussed in Sorensen (1995).  
8 Sutton (2007) does this because he identifies justified beliefs with items of knowledge, but 
he does it for reasons other than those discussed here. 
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treating p as a reason for action, it should be possible for circumstances to 
arise in which it is permissible to believe p but not to include that belief in 
deliberation even though you know that the choice you face is p-dependent. 
The only alternative is to say that circumstances can arise in which it is 
permissible to deliberate from the belief that you ought to Φ even though it 
is impermissible to Φ. That possibility is difficult to make sense of. It 
suggests that the reasons that bear on whether to Φ are somehow different 
from the reasons that bear on whether to judge that you should Φ.9 If 
normative reasons demanded that we somehow act against our own 
judgment about what to do while keeping that judgment in place, it seems 
only the deeply irrational could manage to do everything that the reasons 
required. Reasons cannot be that unreasonable. 
Maybe knowledge that p is the case is not necessary for permissibly 
treating p as a reason for action. It is tempting to say that some Gettier cases 
are counterexamples to KRP. The trend in the literature appears to be one in 
which people are rejecting the knowledge account in favor of some sort of 
justification-based account. This only works if everyone is wrong about what 
justification is. So, you cannot adopt anything like an orthodox account of 
justified belief and say that you are using this concept to shed some light on 
when it is permissible to treat something as a reason for action.  
 
Clayton Littlejohn 
University of Texas at San Antonio 
cmlittlejohn@yahoo.com 
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